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473 
AVOIDING AN “UNAVOIDABLY IMPERFECT 
SITUATION”: SEARCHING FOR STRATEGIES TO 
DIVERT MENTALLY ILL PEOPLE OUT OF 
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS†  
I don’t know why they want to torture me. I’m a rich man. I’m god. 
They want to have me remove the plants from heaven to earth . . .  
—Michael A., a man with severe mental illness, explaining to an 
asylum officer why he fears persecution if removed to Nigeria.1  
Michael A. came into the immigration system, was detained, and 
asserted that he feared persecution if returned to Nigeria, the country that 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) asserted was his home 
country.2 He was interviewed by an asylum officer who recommended that 
he receive a hearing in immigration court on his asylum application.3 
Thousands of individuals have similar experiences every year. What is 
important about Michael A.’s case is that, at some point during this 
process, he claimed that he was a United States citizen.4 Attorneys with 
knowledge of this case state that the government’s proof of his status as a 
non-citizen was uncertain.5 
The asylum officer who interviewed Michael A. noted that he suffers 
from psychosis and until recently was on anti-psychotic medication.6 The 
asylum officer also stated that his testimony was delusional and therefore 
implausible; because it was implausible, it was not credible.7 More 
specifically, the officer noted his psychosis which “calls into question the 
entire credibility of his claim.”8 Michael A. received a hearing but his 
application was denied, and, ultimately, he was ordered deported.9 This 
 
 
 † “[O]ur goal is to ensure that proceedings are as fair as possible in an unavoidably imperfect 
situation. To that end, this decision will provide a framework for analyzing cases in which issues of 
mental competency are raised.” Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 476 (B.I.A. 2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: 
MENTAL DISABILITY, UNFAIR HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM 29 (2010), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/usdeportation0710_0.pdf [hereinafter DEPORTATION 
BY DEFAULT].  
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 29–30. 
 4. Id. at 27. 
 5. Id. at 27. 
 6. Id. at 29–30. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 30.  
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case, and the illegal deportation of multiple mentally ill United States 
citizens,10 has raised questions about the treatment of mentally ill 
individuals in the immigration removal system.11 If mental illness 
automatically tarnishes the credibility of one’s claim, how seriously did 
the immigration officer and court explore his claim of citizenship? Did he 
receive appropriate monitoring, medication, and mental health treatment 
while detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? Most 
importantly, even if Michael A. did not qualify for asylum, are the goals of 
the immigration system advanced by removing an individual with a severe 
mental illness, especially when that illness may have presented barriers to 
the proper presentation of his case? 
Recent efforts to better protect mentally ill individuals in removal 
proceedings have focused on increasing procedural safeguards. Scholars 
and advocates have called for reforms such as providing free attorneys to 
indigent mentally ill individuals,12 requiring DHS to release all mental 
health records in their possession so an individual can document his 
mental illness,13 appointing guardians ad litem for mentally ill 
respondents14 and providing training to immigration judges on mental 
health symptoms.15 The goal of these reforms is to ensure that all 
individuals receive a full and fair hearing.16 
 
 
 10. See infra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 11. For purposes of this Note, “serious mental illness” refers to a mental condition that 
significantly “disrupt[s] a person’s thinking, feeling, mood, ability to relate to others and daily 
functioning.” What is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=about_mental_illness (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). The 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) includes “major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorder, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and borderline personality disorder” as common serious mental illnesses. Id.  
 12. Legal representation is thought to improve outcomes in immigration cases. Asylum seekers 
with legal representation “were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%,” compared to 16.3% approval for 
individuals without legal representation. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007). This statistic is explained in part by the 
selection effect—that legal representatives often do not represent individuals with weak claims—but 
the dramatic difference in grant approval rate suggests that the “power of representation” goes beyond 
the selection effect. Id.; see also Helen Eisner, Comment, Disabled, Defenseless, and Still Deportable: 
Why Deportation Without Representation Undermines Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled 
Immigrants, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 511 (2011) (arguing for right to counsel for mentally ill 
individuals). 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process Rights of Mentally Disabled 
Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373, 378 (2011). 
 15. See infra text accompanying note 105 for a discussion of training. 
 16. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the due process rights of individuals in removal 
proceedings.  
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An important procedural reform came in May 2011 when the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decided Matter of M-A-M-.17 For the first 
time, Matter of M-A-M- established a requirement for immigration judges 
to assess mental competency and provided suggestions for safeguarding 
the procedural rights of mentally ill individuals in removal proceedings.18 
These procedural reforms, however, are insufficient to stop wrongful 
removals of mentally ill people. To prevent the wrongful removal of 
people with severe mental illness, this Note argues that the focus must 
shift from simply increasing procedural rights to developing options to 
divert these individuals out of immigration removal proceedings 
altogether. Terminating proceedings for mentally ill individuals or 
exercising discretion not to place those persons in proceedings in the first 
place will increase accuracy of outcomes, guarantee that those respondents 
who are ultimately removed had a meaningful opportunity to present their 
case, and make the immigration system more humane. 
This Note presents the unique challenges facing mentally ill individuals 
in immigration removal proceedings and the lack of tailored protections in 
the current system. It explores how Matter of M-A-M- presents a limited 
improvement to the current system. Finally, it presents two pathways out 
of immigration removal proceedings, termination and prosecutorial 
discretion, and offers recommendations for strengthening these options.  
I. SEEING THE PROBLEM: MENTALLY ILL PEOPLE IN REMOVAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
A. The Process of Proceedings 
Many different paths may bring an individual with severe mental 
illness into the immigration removal system. Immigration enforcement 
begins with the apprehension of an individual by a DHS officer19 or by a 
 
 
 17. 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 18. Id. at 478. 
 19. DHS is the government agency responsible for immigration service, enforcement, and 
adjudication. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 10, 3 (5th ed. 2009). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dismantled the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and shifted immigration enforcement to the newly-created DHS. 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2006). Within DHS, both ICE and U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection enforce immigration law. Customs and Border Protection focuses on enforcement at 
the border of the United States; “border” includes both land borders and ports of entry such as airports 
and seaports. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra, at 3. ICE enforces immigration law primarily in the 
interior of the country. Id. The development of DHS was not just a structural change but also signaled 
a change in the magnitude of immigration enforcement. The INS had less than two thousand agents 
enforcing immigration law within the United States before September 11, 2001. Jennifer M. Chacón, A 
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state or local law enforcement officer.20 If the officer has prima facie 
evidence that the individual “was entering, attempting to enter, or is 
present in the United States in violation of the immigration laws,”21 the 
immigration officer may serve a charging document commonly called a 
“notice to appear” on the individual.22 This commences removal 
proceedings.23 The individual may be detained from apprehension through 
the conclusion of the proceeding.24 In contested removal proceedings, an 
attorney represents ICE.25 The noncitizen has a right to representation, but 
only at his or her expense.26 At the removal hearing, ICE must establish by 
 
 
Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1572 (2010). The estimated employment for ICE in 2010 was 20,000 
employees. Id. 
 20. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 19, at 649. The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) established the first information-sharing partnerships 
between state and local law enforcement officers and ICE. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
The Secure Communities program announced in March 2008 strengthened these partnerships and 
increased the focus on apprehension of criminal aliens. Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). For 
diverse perspectives on the strengths and concerns of these partnerships, see Shadi Masri, Current 
Development in the Executive Branch: ICE’s Initiation of Secure Communities Program Draws More 
Criticism than Praise, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 533 (2011); Nicholas D. Michaud, Note, From 287(g) to 
SB 1070: The Decline of the Federal Immigration Partnership and the Rise of State-Level Immigration 
Enforcement, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1083 (2010); Yolanda Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of 
Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice 
System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639 (2011). 
 21. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2012). 
 22. 8 C.F.R § 1003.14 (2012). The “notice to appear” includes the time and location of the 
removal hearing, the charged grounds of deportability, and the factual allegations supporting the 
charges. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 19, at 650–51.  
 23. IIRIRA consolidated what was formerly described as “exclusion” and “deportation” 
proceedings into “removal” proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). A removal hearing is an 
administrative proceeding by DHS. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 19, at 10. 
 24. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules and Discretion, 30 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531 (1999). Some noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention. Alice E. 
Loughran, Congress, Categories, and the Constitution—Whether Mandatory Detention of Criminal 
Aliens Violates Due Process, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 681, 683–84 (2004). Five categories of noncitizens 
are subject to mandatory detention: “(1) certain arriving noncitizens, (2) noncitizens subject to 
‘expedited removal,’ (3) noncitizens who have certain criminal convictions, (4) suspected terrorists, 
and (5) noncitizens who have final orders of removal.” Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging Detention: 
Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process Than “Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve 
More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1838–39 (2011). The mandatory detention provisions were 
recommended by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform to ensure that noncitizens did not 
abscond after apprehension. Id. Noncitizens not subject to mandatory detention may still be detained at 
the discretion of DHS. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 19, at 651. See also Geoffrey Heeren, 
Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 601 
(2010). 
 25. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 19, at 654. 
 26. Id. “Because deportation is a civil proceeding, potential deportees have no sixth amendment 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/5
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clear and convincing evidence that the charged individual is in fact a 
noncitizen.27 If that individual is found to be a noncitizen and is 
deportable,28 he or she will be removed unless he or she is eligible for a 
form of affirmative relief from removal such as cancellation of removal, 
asylum, or adjustment of status.29 Both the noncitizen and ICE may appeal 
a decision to the BIA.30 Judicial review is available for some, but not all, 
administrative decisions.31 
B. Mental Illness in the System 
A significant number of individuals in immigration removal 
proceedings have a mental illness. The majority of information on 
individuals in removal proceedings with mental illness focuses on the 
detained population. The Department of Immigrant Health Services 
estimated that between two and five percent of individuals detained in 
2008 had a “serious mental illness” and between ten and sixteen percent of 
detainees had “some form of encounter with a mental health professional 
or the mental health system.”32 Additionally, for some people the 
 
 
right to counsel.” U.S. v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 27. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 19, at 655. The removal of United States citizens is 
prohibited by law. The laws governing removal refer only to “deportable aliens.” Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2008). “Alien” is defined in immigration law as “any 
person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2008); see also Problems 
with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 15 (2008) [hereinafter Problems with ICE Interrogation] (statement of Gary 
Mead, Deputy Dir. of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations). 
 28. Individuals apprehended in the United States who entered without inspection at a border are 
treated as subjects of admission at the time of the removal hearing and therefore must satisfy the 
grounds of inadmissibility. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008). A 
noncitizen who has been admitted may still be “deportable” if he or she does not satisfy another set of 
grounds related to criminal convictions, false claims of citizenship, marriage fraud, and other behavior. 
Id. 
 29. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 19, at 656.  
 30. Id. at 657.  
 31. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005). Availability of 
judicial review of agency decisions is a highly complex area of immigration law. See Jill E. Family, 
Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 
59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 582 (2011); Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution’s Most 
Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1367 (2006); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the 
Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459 (2006); Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formula for 
Judicial Review: The Law-Fact Distinction in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 57 (2010).  
 32. DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting Selected responses from ICE to 
questions posed by The Washington Post regarding the provision of mental health care to immigration 
detainees, May 2008, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp.srv/nation/specials/immigration/documents/ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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experience of detention and removal proceedings leads to increased 
symptoms of anxiety and depression.33  
The 2008 ICE Standards provide guidance for assessing and 
responding to mental illness in detained individuals. Specifically, these 
standards provide that newly admitted detainees will have a mental health 
screening within twelve hours and will receive a comprehensive appraisal 
within fourteen days; all detainees will have access to twenty-four-hour 
emergency medical, dental, and mental health services; and that “detainees 
with . . . known mental health concerns will be referred . . . for evaluation, 
diagnosis, treatment, and stabilization.”34 Unfortunately, these standards 
are not always met.35 Many detention facilities do not meet the guideline 
of conducting a mental health assessment within twelve hours of a new 
detainee arriving.36 The practice of conducting mental health screenings in 
English is a problem for the many detainees who are not proficient 
English-speakers.37 Lack of staff raises concerns about supervision and 
care.38 Dennis Slate, a top mental health official in ICE, reported that the 
 
 
day3_ice_mentalhealth.gif (accessed May 11, 2010)). The Department of Immigrant Health Services 
“provides health services in some immigration detention facilities . . . .” Id. No definition of serious 
mental illness or “encounter” with the mental health system was provided. See id.  
 33. The symptoms may be triggered by feeling of lack of control, uncertainty, and isolation. 
CARA M. CHEYETTE, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUNISHMENT BEFORE JUSTICE: INDEFINITE 
DETENTION IN THE US 11–13 (Scott Alan ed., 2011), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_ 
Reports/indefinite-detention-june2011.pdf.  
 34. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 2008 OPERATIONS MANUAL ICE 
PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS: MEDICAL CARE 1–2, 11 (Dec. 2, 2008), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/medical_care.pdf. The standards 
also provide that health authorities must be notified within twenty-four hours if detainees need or 
request mental health services. Id. at 12. Every facility is expected to have a mental health program 
that offers intake screenings, referral, crisis intervention, transfers to a mental health facility if the 
detention facility cannot care for the detainees mental health needs, and a suicide prevention program. 
Id. at 13. Additional guidance is provided on isolation of mentally ill individuals, the use of restraints, 
and forcible psychotropic medication. Id. at 14–15. Additional standards focus specifically on suicide 
prevention and intervention. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 2008 OPERATIONS 
MANUAL ICE PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS: SUICIDE PREVENTION AND 
INTERVENTION (Dec. 2, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/ 
suicide_prevention_and_intervention.pdf.  
 35. For an analysis of the ICE detention health care system from former Director of the ICE 
Office of Detention Policy and Planning, see Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for 
Criminal Inmates and Immigrant Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441 (2010).  
 36. TEXAS APPLESEED, JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRATION’S HIDDEN POPULATION: PROTECTING THE 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT AND DETENTION 
SYSTEM 25 (2010), available at http://www.texasappleseed.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task 
=doc_download&gid=313.  
 37. See id. 
 38. The Washington Post’s study of the Willacy County detention center found: “Suicidal 
detainees can go undetected or unmonitored. Psychological problems are mistaken for physical 
maladies or a lack of coping skills. In some cases, detainees’ conditions severely deteriorate behind 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/5
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ratio of detention staff to mentally ill inmates was 1:1,142,39 far below the 
ratio of 1:400 in Federal Bureau of Prisons facilities.40  
Mentally ill individuals experience unique obstacles in immigration 
court, and immigration judges have identified working with incompetent 
respondents as “one of the many challenges” that they face.41 For 
individuals with severe mental illness the courtroom experience may 
become “an experience of pervading perplexity, bewilderment, and 
distress.”42 Many forms of mental illness exaggerate or diminish one’s 
presentation of emotion, making judges less likely to believe that an 
individual has good moral character and merits the judge’s favorable 
exercise of discretion.43 Mental illness is dynamic; a person who is 
competent to perform some tasks may nonetheless be unable to present 
evidence and understand the proceeding.44  
It is impossible to quantify the number of individuals whose mental 
illness has prevented that individual from presenting his or her case for 
relief from removal. However, there are multiple cases in the last ten years 
 
 
bars. Some get help only when cellmates force guards and medical staff to pay attention.” Dana Priest 
& Amy Goldstein, Careless Detention: Suicides Point to Gaps in Treatment, Errors in Psychiatric 
Diagnoses and Drugs Plague Strained Immigration System, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, at A1. The 
Willacy County detention center in Texas did not have a clinical doctor or pharmacist. Bill Ong Hing, 
Systemic Failure: Mental Illness, Detention, and Deportation, 16 U.C. DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
341, 365 (citing Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Careless Detention: System of Neglect, WASH. POST, 
May 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/immigration/index.html). Only 
one part-time psychiatrist worked for the facility, which housed 2,018 detainees. Id.  
 39. FLA. IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CTR., DYING FOR DECENT CARE: BAD MEDICINE IN 
IMMIGRATION CUSTODY 32 (2009), available at http://www.tallahassee.com/assets/pdf/CD131100321 
.pdf.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Mimi E. Tsankov, Incompetent Respondents in Removal Proceedings, 3 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 
1, 1 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsleter/ILA%202009/vol3no4.pdf. 
 42. Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Appellate Decision-Making in the Context of Disabled Litigants, 
24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 313, 316 (2000). 
 43. As one psychologist noted, people with post-traumatic stress disorder face a complicated 
“balancing act” in presenting testimony. DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT, supra note 1, at 35. “[I]f the 
person is totally shut down, the judge may assume the person is apathetic. If the respondent is sobbing 
on the stand, the judge accuses them of making a scene.” Id. (quoting Human Rights Watch Interview 
with Dr. Denise Berte, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 15, 2010)). 
 44. Discussing mental illness in the criminal context, Justice Breyer wrote:  
Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It 
interferes with an individual’s functioning at different times in different ways . . . . In certain 
instances an individual may well be able to . . . work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time 
he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the 
help of counsel.  
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175–76 (2008). For further discussion on the dynamic nature of 
mental illness, see Kevin M. Cremin et al., Ensuring a Fair Hearing for Litigants with Mental 
Illnesses: The Law and Psychology of Capacity, Admissibility, and Credibility Assessments in Civil 
Proceedings, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 455, 473–74 (2009). 
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where mentally ill United States citizens have been illegally removed.45 
Because ICE does not have jurisdiction over United States citizens, these 
removals are unlawful.46 One such example is Peter Guzman, a 
cognitively-impaired twenty-nine-year-old United States citizen who came 
to ICE’s attention after his arrest for trespassing.47 He was deported to 
Mexico and was missing for approximately three months before his family 
found him and brought him home.48 Another case is Mark Lyttle, a United 
States citizen with “a record of bipolar depression and a learning 
disability,” who was removed to Mexico on two occasions even though 
FBI fingerprint records indicated that he was a United States citizen.49 In 
another case, a severely mentally ill United States citizen told immigration 
officials that she was a Russian immigrant.50 She was almost removed to 
Russia as a result.51 
The unlawful removal of mentally ill United States citizens is a 
symptom of the error rate in the immigration adjudication system. Some 
error is likely,52 but the immigration system’s inability to determine that a 
respondent is a United States citizen raises great concerns about less-
obvious injustices and mistakes in the removal system.53 The errors matter 
because of the harsh consequences of removal, especially for an individual 
with serious mental illness. Peter Guzman was found “bathing in the 
 
 
 45. See generally Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting 
U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011) (presenting quantitative analysis of the 
rate of detention and deportation of United States citizens). 
 46. Problems with ICE Interrogation, supra note 27, at 15 (statement of Gary Mead, Deputy Dir. 
of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations).  
 47. Id. at 30 (statement of James Brosnahan, Senior Partner at Morrison & Foerster, LLP and 
attorney for Peter Guzman). 
 48. Id. at 30–31. 
 49. Eugenia Pyntikova, Mental Illness in Immigration Detention Facilities: Searching for the 
Rights to Receive & Refuse Treatment, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 151, 167–68 (2010).  
 50. Emily Ramshaw, Mentally Ill Immigrants Have Little Hope for Care When Detained, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, July 13, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/MHI/library/Emily% 
20Ramshaw,%20The%20Dallas%20Morning%20News,%20July%2013,%202009.pdf.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Some would argue that error is inevitable. In a 2008 Congressional hearing on the 
interrogation and detention of United States citizens, Representative Steve King (R-Iowa) stated, 
“There is a huge human haystack of humanity that crosses our border every night that has piled up 
here in the United States . . . . To deal with all of that without a single mistake would be asking too 
much of a mortal.” Problems with ICE Interrogation, supra note 27, at 3. 
 53. Concern about the accuracy of the immigration adjudication system is widespread. 
Addressing this issue, Judge Richard Posner once stated “the adjudication of these cases at the 
administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.” Benslimane v. 
Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 
2003)). One immigration judge likened immigration removal proceedings to “holding death penalty 
cases in traffic court.” Julia Preston, Lawyers Back Creating New Immigration Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2010, at A14.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2012] AVOIDING AN “UNAVOIDABLY IMPERFECT SITUATION” 481 
 
 
 
 
Tijuana River and eating garbage,”54 and Mark Lyttle was discovered 
“drifting among Latin American shelters and obtaining nourishment and 
liquid from roadside soda cans in El Salvador.”55 Greater caution in cases 
involving mentally ill respondents will prevent illegal removal of United 
States citizens;56 ensure the protection of noncitizens with claims to relief 
from removal proceedings; and uphold the humanitarian goals of the 
immigration adjudication system.  
C. Existing Protections of People With Mental Illness and Advocacy for 
Improvement 
Before Matter of M-A-M-, immigration statutes and regulations 
provided limited protections for individuals with serious mental illness in 
immigration removal proceedings. “If it is impracticable by reason of an 
alien’s mental incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding,” 
additional safeguards must be provided to protect an alien’s rights and 
privileges.57 “Present” is interpreted to include both physical and mental 
presence.58 A respondent who is not “present” may have an “attorney, 
legal representative, legal guardian, near relative, or friend . . . appear on 
[his or her] behalf.”59 If none of these people appear on behalf of the 
incompetent individual, the respondent’s custodian may appear.60 An 
immigration judge may not accept an admission of removability from an 
incompetent respondent who is neither represented nor accompanied.61  
In addition to the specific requirements of immigration law and 
regulations, individuals in immigration removal proceedings are entitled to 
 
 
 54. Stevens, supra note 45, at 612 (citing Jacqueline Stevens, Thin ICE, NATION, June 23, 2008, 
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/thin-ice). 
 55. Id. (citing Interview with Mark Lyttle, deported U.S. citizen, in Kennesaw, Ga. (June 22, 
2009)). Prior to deportation, these men were either “housed and self-sufficient or cared for by their 
families. . . .” Id.  
 56. Hiroshi Motomura describes this as a “citizen proxy” argument. Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1728 (2010). 
Through citizen proxy appeals, unauthorized migrants show that a United States citizen’s or lawful 
permanent resident’s rights will be protected by upholding a migrant’s rights. Id. The citizen or 
permanent resident is an “interest surrogate” for the migrant. Id. at 1754.  
 57. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006).  
 58. Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007). “A mentally incompetent person, 
although physically present, is absent from the hearing for all practical purposes.” Id. 
 59. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4 (2012). 
 60. Id. The custodian is a representative of DHS—the very same agency arguing for the 
respondent’s removal and possibly also detaining the respondent. Clapman, supra note 14, at 381. 
Clapman describes this unusual arrangement: “as clear a conflict of interest as can be imagined but one 
expressly authorized by the current regulations.” Id. 
 61. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2012). 
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due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.62 This “includes the right 
to a full and fair hearing,”63 and the right “to be heard upon the questions 
involving [the] right to be and remain in the United States.”64 Although 
noncitizens do not receive the same complement of rights as guaranteed to 
citizens,65 the constitutional protection of due process extends to even 
those “whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or 
transitory.”66 These due process rights are grounded in the Supreme 
Court’s acknowledgment that deportation or removal has a serious impact 
on individual liberty. In Ng Fung Ho v. White, the Court said deportation 
“may result . . . in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life 
worth living.”67  
Due process for noncitizens in removal proceedings simply requires 
that the proceeding meets a test of fundamental fairness.68 Compliance 
with the safeguards provided in statute and regulation is often considered 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process requirements.69 This 
includes the right to representation at no cost to the government70 and that 
the respondent has a “reasonable opportunity” to present and examine 
evidence and cross-examine witnesses.71 While “[m]eticulous care must be 
exercised lest the procedure by which [an individual] is deprived of that 
 
 
 62. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 
 63. In re M-D-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 540, 542 (B.I.A. 2002) (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 
32–33 (1982)). 
 64. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); accord Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 
510, 523 (2003). 
 65. “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 
Demore, 538 U.S. at 522. 
 66. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). 
 67. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
 68. The fundamental fairness test was established in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 
(6th Cir. 1975). In Landon v. Plasencia, the Court recommended a different test to determine if a 
lawful permanent resident who left the United States and was placed in exclusion proceedings upon 
her return was afforded due process. 459 U.S. at 35. Instead of examining whether the proceedings met 
fundamental fairness, the Supreme Court stated that the lower court to which the case was remanded 
should use the three-prong balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge. Id. at 34 (citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)). The Mathews test balances, “[f]irst, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 69. In Nee Hao Wong v. INS, the respondent was accompanied by his state-appointed conservator 
as well as by counsel. Nee Hao Wong v. INS, 550 F.2d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1977). This complied with 
the regulation stating that respondents for whom it is impracticable to be present due to mental 
incompetency can have a guardian appear on his or her behalf and so satisfied due process. Id. at 523.  
 70. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006). 
 71. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
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liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness,”72 the immigration 
judge has a great deal of discretion to construct a hearing that is 
fundamentally fair.73 The judge’s decisions are awarded great deference on 
review.74  
Prior to the BIA opinion in Matter of M-A-M-, an evaluation of 
respondent’s mental health was not included in the package of procedural 
rights. In Mohamed v. Gonzales, the BIA acknowledged that respondent 
Abdi Gelle Mohamed was mentally ill.75 However, the immigration judge 
did not hold a competency hearing.76 The court noted that Mohamed 
responded to the charges against him, coordinated witness appearances, 
was aware of the nature of proceedings, and resisted removal.77 On appeal, 
the court held that the absence of a competency hearing did not violate 
Mohamed’s due process rights.78  
Even if a respondent is determined to be mentally ill, the proceedings 
continue against that individual. In Nee Hao Wong v. INS, one of the first 
cases to address the due process rights of mentally ill respondents, the 
Ninth Circuit held that due process did not require delaying proceedings 
until a respondent’s competency was restored.79 Rather, the Court held that 
“[t]he Immigration and [Nationality] Act contemplates that deportation 
proceedings may be had against mental incompetents.”80  
This differs notably from the mental competence standard applied to 
criminal defendants.81 The criminal competence standard requires that a 
 
 
 72. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).  
 73. An immigration judge can operate in “wide margins” without “offend[ing the] principles of 
fundamental fairness.” Laurent v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Logue v. Dore, 103 
F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
 74. This deference is a product of the plenary power doctrine, considered “the most famous 
jurisprudential piece of American constitutional immigration law.” Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s 
Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 346 (2008). Plenary power in immigration is:  
a collection of several separate but related principles: first, that the immigration authority is 
reposed in the federal government and not the states; second, that the authority is allocated in 
some fashion between the executive and legislative departments of the federal government; 
and, third, that the judicial branch has an extremely limited role in reviewing the executive’s 
immigration decisions if, indeed, the judiciary may review those decisions at all. 
Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen 
Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 939 (1995). 
 75. Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 527. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Nee Hao Wong v. INS, 550 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1977).  
 80. Id.  
 81. See generally Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 
(1975). “[C]ontrary to the substantive due process protection from trial and conviction to which a 
mentally incompetent criminal defendant is entitled, removal proceedings may go forward against 
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defendant have a “rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him” and “has sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”82 
Requiring that a defendant can comprehend and participate in the hearing 
“has long been accepted.”83 A criminal must be able to access the rights 
that are essential to a fair trial such as effective assistance of counsel, 
confrontation and cross-examination, and testifying on one’s own behalf.84 
Although some may consider removal to be as grave a consequence as 
incarceration, respondents in immigration proceedings receive far fewer 
constitutional protections than criminal defendants.85 This difference is 
based largely on a formalistic distinction between criminal law and civil 
law, with immigration removal proceedings falling in the latter category 
and thus meriting fewer procedural safeguards.86  
Another source of protections for mentally ill individuals comes in the 
form of guidance in the Immigration Judge Benchbook. The Benchbook 
encourages immigration judges who suspect that a respondent has a 
mental illness to use simple sentences, build an extensive record, grant the 
respondent continuances to try and obtain representation, and potentially 
help the respondent secure legal representation.87  
This patchwork of laws, regulations, and guidance leaves gaps in the 
protection of many mentally ill individuals. The BIA decision in Matter of 
M-A-M- took the first steps towards achieving many of these goals.88 
 
 
incompetent aliens.” Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted) (citing Nee Hao Wong, 550 F.2d at 523). 
 82. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.  
 83. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. 
 84. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Drope, 
420 U.S. at 171-72). 
 85. See Nee Hao Wong, 550 F.2d at 523. “[T]he full trappings of procedural protections that are 
accorded criminal defendants are not necessarily constitutionally required for deportation 
proceedings.” Id. Extensive scholarship explores the interplay of criminal procedure rights and 
immigration law. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: 
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-
Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal 
Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008); Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing 
Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 491 (2011). 
 86. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 
(2011). 
 87. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Immigration Judge 
Benchbook: Mental Health Issues: Part II.B, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/MHI/ 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Benchbook]. 
 88. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011). 
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II. THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS RESPONDS: CREATING A 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT IN MATTER OF M-A-M- 
A. Establishment of New Procedural Safeguards 
In Matter of M-A-M-, the BIA established a framework for immigration 
judges to assess mental competency and described some safeguards that 
judges can provide to mentally incompetent respondents.89 In this case, the 
respondent represented himself pro se throughout the proceeding.90 He 
told the judge he had schizophrenia and was not receiving proper 
medication at the time of the hearing.91 The immigration judge found him 
removable and denied his applications for relief from removal.92 The 
respondent appealed the decision to the BIA and alleged “that the 
Immigration Judge failed to properly assess his mental competency.”93 
The BIA held that competency is presumed,94 and that no obligation to 
assess an alien’s competency arises until there are “indicia of mental 
incompetency.”95 If indicia are present, the immigration judge must 
determine if the respondent can participate in the hearing.96 The 
immigration judge must determine “whether an alien . . . has a rational and 
factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can 
consult with the attorney or representative if there is one, and has a 
reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.”97 To assist the immigration judge in determining 
competency, DHS must provide any evidence in its possession related to a 
 
 
 89. Id. at 479–84. 
 90. Id. at 475. 
 91. Id. He submitted reports and a psychiatric evaluation from the New York State Office of 
Mental Health documenting his mental health problems. Id. 
 92. Id. at 475–76. 
 93. Id. at 476. 
 94. Id. at 477 (citing Muñoz-Monsalve v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 95. Id. The judge may observe indicia from respondent’s behavior or evidence of illness or 
incompetency in the record, although “a diagnosis of mental illness does not automatically equate to a 
lack of competency.” Id. at 479–80. Additionally, because mental illness is not stagnant the judge is 
required to re-assess competency throughout the hearing to identify if competency has decreased or 
been restored. Id. at 480. 
 96. Id. at 480. Potential methods the judge may use to test competency include asking respondent 
simple questions about his or her whereabouts and mental state, asking if respondent has or is taking 
medication for a mental illness, continuing proceedings so respondent can obtain evidence about 
competency, using a mental competency evaluation, relying on a friend or family member to share 
information for the respondent, or delaying the case so respondent can obtain mental health treatment 
or a representative. Id. at 480–81. 
 97. Id. at 479. 
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respondent’s incompetency.98 If a respondent lacks sufficient competency 
to proceed, the immigration judge must prescribe safeguards pursuant to 
section 240(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.99 The BIA 
vaguely suggested that the immigration judge may look into alternatives to 
removal proceedings if, after best efforts are taken, respondent is still 
unable to participate in the hearing.100 
Here, the BIA found “good cause to believe that the respondent lacked 
sufficient competency.”101 They remanded the case so the immigration 
judge could apply the new framework for assessing competency to make a 
finding as to respondent’s competency, and apply the appropriate and 
necessary safeguards.102 
B. Strengths, Gaps, and Limitations in the Decision 
The BIA decision in Matter of M-A-M- provided, at minimum, a 
framework that judges, practitioners, and respondents in immigration 
proceedings could look to for guidance. The decision equipped 
immigration judges with new tools to assess mental competency. 
Requiring DHS to provide any evidence in its possession related to a 
respondent’s incompetency will provide the only medical evidence of 
mental illness in many cases. As the custodian of a detained respondent, 
DHS often has medical or mental health records that explain what the 
respondent cannot.103 Demanding release of these documents could greatly 
aid immigration judges in understanding the factual background of a 
respondent’s mental illness in future cases. The decision also correctly 
acknowledges the dynamic nature of mental health. Requiring immigration 
judges to reassess competency throughout the proceeding will ensure that 
procedural safeguards are tailored to an individual’s current needs and 
abilities.104  
However, the decision in Matter of M-A-M- leaves many gaps in the 
protections for mentally ill people in immigration proceedings. One 
concern is that immigration judges lack expertise and training to assess 
 
 
 98. Id. at 480. 
 99. Id. at 481. 
 100. Id. at 483.  
 101. Id. at 484. 
 102. Id. The court did not give any examples or specifics as to what safeguards might be 
appropriate in this particular situation.  
 103. See, e.g., FLA. IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 39, at 6. 
 104. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 480. This understanding of mental health is 
consistent with clinical research. See Cremin et al., supra note 44, at 476. 
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competency.105 Immigration judges are not medical or mental health 
experts. Without extensive training and the involvement of mental health 
professionals in the immigration system, it is unlikely that immigration 
judges can either accurately assess whether someone has indicia of mental 
illness or understand how that illness may affect the respondent’s 
participation in the proceeding. 
The concern about judge’s ability to assess competence is heightened 
by the use of videoconference technology for detained respondents. 
Through videoconferencing technology, the respondent remains in the 
detention center and appears on a video screen in the immigration 
courtroom.106 Although the government states that the use of this 
technology in lieu of live hearings in the same courtroom “does not 
change the adjudicative quality or decisional outcomes,”107 many 
disagree.108 Some scholars argue that fact-finding and credibility 
assessments are more accurate when conducted in person.109 If an 
immigration judge’s perception is altered by the use of videoconferencing 
technology, the judge may fail to notice that a respondent is mentally 
incompetent and therefore fail to provide essential safeguards. Another 
issue is that although immigration judges can ask for a competency 
evaluation,110 it is not clear who must arrange and pay for the 
evaluation.111  
 
 
 105. See Due Process for People with Mental Disabilities in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 
33 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 882, 895–96 (2009). Competency assessments are 
required under the Matter of M-A-M- framework. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479.  
 106. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET: EOIR’S 
VIDEO CONFERENCING INITIATIVE (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/VCFactSheet 
Sep04.pdf. Video conferencing reduces costs because respondents do not need to be transported from 
distant detention facilities to immigration court. Id. Additionally, videoconferencing increases 
efficiency by evenly spreading cases across large groups of immigration judges, rather than having 
heavy caseloads in one area and light caseloads in another area. Id.  
 107. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET: EOIR 
HEADQUARTERS IMMIGRATION COURT (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/HQIC 
FactSheet.pdf. 
 108. See, e.g., Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2002); Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, 
Effective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal 
Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259 (2008); Developments in the Law—Access to Courts: Access to 
Courts and Videoconferencing in Immigration Court Proceedings, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1181 (2009).  
 109. Anne Bowen Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote 
Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1108–11 (2004). Studies of videoconferencing in criminal courts 
raise concerns about the limitations of video technology and its inability to capture nonverbal cues like 
facial expression, gaze, gestures, and body language—that are not visible within the screen—and eye 
contact. Id. 
 110. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 481.  
 111. If DHS arranges and pays for the mental competency evaluation, their involvement as a party 
in the proceedings does raise a conflict of interest. LEGAL ACTION CTR., REPRESENTING CLIENTS WITH 
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Additionally, the focus of Matter of M-A-M- on individuals in removal 
proceedings provides little help to individuals who stipulate to their 
removal and thus never appear in front of an immigration judge.112 The 
stipulated removal program allows an individual to stipulate to his or her 
removal and thereby waive a hearing in front of an immigration judge.113 
The immigration judge may enter a removal order based on this stipulation 
by both the respondent and the government.114 The stipulated removal 
program speeds up immigration adjudication by eliminating the 
requirement of holding a hearing and potentially an appeal.115 The 
program also benefits some respondents. A respondent who is ineligible 
for relief or wants to avoid a prolonged hearing process and long-term 
detention may prefer to stipulate to his or her removal and quickly be 
removed from the country.116  
A narrow reading of Matter of M-A-M- might limit its application to 
individuals actually in removal proceedings. However, if the approval of 
 
 
MENTAL COMPETENCY ISSUES UNDER MATTER OF M-A-M- 8–9 (2011), available at http://www.legal 
actioncenter.org/sites/default/files/mental-competency-issues-3-8-2012minorupdate.pdf.  
 112. 29,012 cases went through the stipulated removal program in 2009. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 OVERVIEW: 
CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 18, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/ 
fy2011overviewcongressionaljustification.pdf. “The Attorney General shall provide by regulation for 
the entry by an immigration judge of an order of removal stipulated to by the alien (or the alien’s 
representative) and the Service. A stipulated order shall constitute a conclusive determination of the 
alien’s removability from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2006). 
 113. Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 595, 616 (2009). 
 114. Id.  
The stipulation shall include:  
(1) An admission that all factual allegations contained in the charging document are true and 
correct as written;  
(2) A concession of deportability or inadmissibility as charged; 
(3) A statement that the alien makes no application for relief under the Act; 
(4) A designation of a country for deportation or removal under section 241(b)(2)(A)(i) of 
the Act; 
(5) A concession to the introduction of the written stipulation of the alien as an exhibit to the 
Record of Proceeding;  
(6) A statement that the alien understands the consequences of the stipulated request and that 
the alien enters the request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently;  
(7) A statement that the alien will accept a written order for his or her deportation, exclusion 
or removal as a final disposition of the proceedings; and  
(8) A waiver of appeal of the written order of deportation or removal. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012). 
 115. Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 595, 616–17 (2009). 
 116. Id. at 645. Unfortunately, “government coercion, misinformation or incomplete information” 
may also influence respondent’s choice to stipulate to his or her removal. Id. at 642. 
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stipulated removal orders also implicates Matter of M-A-M-, it is unclear 
how an immigration judge would be able to screen for indicia of 
incompetency simply by reviewing the stipulated removal paperwork. This 
concern is particularly relevant in jurisdictions where judges approve 
stipulated orders of removal from individuals detained in mental 
institutions.117 Some judges require an individual to be brought in for a 
hearing before the judge will approve a stipulated order of removal.118 
This can help ensure that a respondent’s waiver of rights was “voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent.”119 Such a requirement, though, diminishes the 
efficiency goals of the stipulated removal program.120 Read broadly, 
Matter of M-A-M- may require compromises in the stipulated removal 
program.  
Finally, the framework provides no guidance for cases where the 
respondent’s mental illness is so severe that he or she cannot share 
information, understand the testimony of others, or effectively present his 
or her case.121 As Part III will discuss, this insistence on moving mentally 
ill individuals through proceedings despite breakdowns in the procedural 
protections creates a danger of wrongful removal and other error. 
Preventing these problems requires developing options to divert mentally 
ill individuals out of proceedings. 
III. TWO PATHS OUT OF PROCEEDINGS—TERMINATION AND 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
Given the ongoing challenges in evaluating the competency of 
individuals in removal proceedings and guaranteeing their full 
participation, I turn now to options for diverting respondents out of 
proceedings altogether when their mental illnesses present insurmountable 
 
 
 117. Baltimore Chief Counsel for ICE noted that “[w]e do use Stipulated Removal in cases of 
aliens who have been found not criminally responsible and who are detained at a state mental 
institution.” JENNIFER LEE KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 26 n.40 (2011), 
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/irc/Deportation_Without_Due_Process_2011.pdf [hereinafter 
DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS] (emphasis added) (quoting Chief Counsel Offices Responses: 
Stipulated Removal Process (Feb. 10, 2006)). 
 118. Id. at 28 n.53 (citing correspondence within ICE noting that the “chief immigration judge and 
court administration in New York City ‘stated clearly that they will not sign off on Stipulated Removal 
Orders without having the detainee brought to court’” and that “immigration judges in San Juan and 
Buffalo require court appearances for unrepresented aliens”). 
 119. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b).  
 120. An internal ICE document described an immigration judge’s demand to hold a hearing before 
approving the orders as “making the use of a stipulated order pointless.” DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS, supra note 117, at 28 n.53.  
 121. See supra note 100. 
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barriers. I analyze two potential paths out of proceedings—termination of 
proceedings by the immigration judge and prosecutorial discretion by ICE 
agents and counsel. Finally, I propose reforms to strengthen these options.  
A. Termination of Removal Proceedings 
Termination of removal proceedings is a process whereby the 
immigration judge cancels the removal proceedings against an individual, 
leaving him or her just as he or she was prior to commencement of the 
proceedings.122 The respondent does not gain immigration status or a 
pathway to permanent relief.123 The only benefit to the respondent is relief 
from the immediate removal proceeding.124 The following section will 
explore the regulatory and due process basis for an immigration judge’s 
power to terminate removal proceedings against a mentally ill individual.  
1. Regulatory Basis for Immigration Judges’ Power to Terminate 
Proceedings for Individuals with Severe Mental Illness  
Immigration regulations explicitly provides for termination of 
proceedings when an alien has a pending naturalization application, has 
demonstrated prima facie eligibility for naturalization, and presents special 
humanitarian considerations.125 Notably, the BIA has interpreted 
immigration law and regulations to prohibit an immigration judge from 
terminating removal proceedings for purely humanitarian reasons (such as 
mental illness) if the respondent is removable.126  
The federal courts give great deference to BIA interpretations of 
immigration law, which carry the force of law. This deference towards 
agency legal interpretations was developed in Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.127 Where Congress’s intent is clear in the 
statute, the agency must give effect to such “unambiguously expressed 
 
 
 122. Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the 
Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 
1109, 1112 n.20 (2008). 
 123. Id. 
 124. This means that proceedings can always be brought against the respondent again in the 
future. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 125. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2012).  
 126. Matter of Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971); see also Panova-Bohannan v. 
Ashcroft, 74 F. App’x. 424, 425 (5th Cir. 2003); Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. INS, 640 F.2d 1139, 1142 
(9th Cir. 1981); Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 127. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing the standard for deference to administrative interpretations 
of law).  
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intent.”128 If the statute is unclear or silent on the issue, the reviewing court 
will defer to an agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”129 Statutory interpretations 
developed through case-by-case adjudications which carry precedential 
value receive Chevron deference.130  
Applying this deferential review standard, the federal courts have 
limited immigration judges’ discretion to terminate proceedings based on 
the effect of mental illness on an individual’s participation in and 
understanding of the proceedings. In Panova-Bohannan v. Ashcroft, the 
Fifth Circuit looked to statutory language stating that “[a]t the conclusion 
of the [removal] proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an 
alien is removable from the United States.”131 The court also agreed with 
the BIA that immigration officials, not judges, possess the discretion to 
terminate removal proceedings.132 Finding that the BIA position was not 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” the court 
deferred to the BIA.133 Similar positions have been upheld in the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits.134  
The federal courts that have considered this issue have deferred to the 
BIA’s limited interpretation of immigration judges’ power to terminate 
proceedings. However, this interpretation appears contrary to the plain 
language and structure of the regulations. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.12(c) provides:  
The order of the immigration judge shall direct the respondent’s 
removal from the United States, or the termination of the 
proceedings, or other such disposition of the case as may be 
appropriate. The immigration judge is authorized to issue orders in 
the alternative or in combination as he or she may deem 
necessary.135  
 
 
 128. Id. at 843.  
 129. Id. at 844. 
 130. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 
915, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 131. Panova-Bohannan v. Ashcroft, 74 F. App’x. 424, 425 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2006)).  
 132. Id.; see also Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The immigration 
judge is not empowered to review the wisdom of the INS in instituting the proceedings . . . . This 
division between the functions of the immigration judge and those of INS enforcement officials is 
quite plausible and has been undeviatingly adhered to by the INS.”).  
 133. Panova-Bohannan, 74 F. App’x at 426 (citing Lopez-Telles, 564 F.2d at 1304). 
 134. See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001); Jean v. Nelson, 
727 F.2d 957, 981 (11th Cir. 1984).  
 135. 8 C.F.R. 1240.12(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Arguably, this regulation can be read to include termination as a potential 
outcome of a proceeding. Although the immigration regulations only 
describe one situation where the immigration judge clearly has power to 
terminate proceedings, no regulation or statute explicitly limits termination 
to this instance.  
Additionally, the Immigration Judge Benchbook developed by the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review provides possible support for 
termination in other situations. The Benchbook states that the immigration 
judge should take steps to ensure fundamental fairness that “may include 
but are not limited to administratively closing or terminating 
proceedings.”136 Because the Benchbook is a guidance document that is 
not intended to carry the force of law,137 it would not receive the highly 
deferential Chevron standard, but it may receive some degree of respect 
based on its limited power to persuade.138 
The lack of clarity in the language of the statute suggests that room 
remains for disagreement by a different circuit, particularly given the 
Benchbook’s timid endorsement of termination of proceedings on account 
of mental illness that interferes with participation in the hearing.139 For 
termination to present a viable pathway out of proceedings for mentally ill 
individuals, regulatory reform is necessary to ensure immigration judges’ 
ability to terminate proceedings in this situation. 
2. Constitutional Due Process Basis for Immigration Judges’ Power to 
Terminate Proceedings for Individuals with Severe Mental Illness  
Another basis for terminating proceedings is that continuing 
proceedings against a mentally ill individual would violate his or her due 
process rights. Individuals in removal proceedings are entitled to 
procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.140 To constitute a due 
process violation, the denial of termination must have likely affected the 
results of the hearing.141 Thus far, the BIA and federal courts have never 
found that an individual’s due process rights were violated because his or 
her mental illness prevented a full and fair hearing. 
 
 
 136. Benchbook, supra note 87.  
 137. The Benchbook describes itself as “only . . . a guide for immigration judges.” Id. 
 138. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).  
 139. See supra note 136. 
 140. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (citing The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 
100–01 (1903)). 
 141. Muñoz-Monsalve v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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In one line of due process cases brought by mentally ill individuals in 
proceedings, the BIA and courts have found the respondent to be 
sufficiently competent and therefore continuing proceedings does not 
violate due process. Merely having headaches and memory problems 
during proceedings did not constitute incompetency in Nelson v. INS.142 In 
a more extreme example, the respondent in In re: Kirk Troy Patrick Smikle 
spent two years in a residential treatment program for schizophrenia.143 He 
told the immigration judge that he was “okay” to proceed although he 
earlier said he was confused when he entered a plea.144 Because the 
respondent stated that he could proceed and the court did not find his 
claim of incompetence to be substantiated, there was no due process 
violation.145  
Additionally, courts find that the due process rights of a respondent 
who cannot understand or participate in the hearing are sufficiently 
protected if the respondent has legal representation. In Matter of H-, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals found that the hearing was fair because an 
alien of “unsound mind” was represented by counsel who introduced 
evidence and examined witnesses.146 In Matter of E-, the respondent was 
considered sufficiently represented despite having a diagnosed mental 
disability, history of hospitalization, and stating that he was “unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of the . . . removal 
proceedings.”147 His claim of due process violation was denied.148 In 
Soobrian v. Attorney General, the court held that petitioner’s due process 
rights were not violated because he was present at the hearing, had 
counsel, and witnesses testified on his behalf.149 The courts do not seem 
concerned that an attorney’s representation of his or her client may be 
hampered by that client’s mental illness.150  
Notably, in all of these cases, the respondent was represented by 
counsel, and the court found that the respondent’s interests were 
 
 
 142. 232 F.3d 258, 261–62 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 143. In re Kirk Troy Patrick Smikle, No. A41 361 229, 2007 WL 2463933, at *1 (B.I.A. Aug. 6, 
2007). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at *2. 
 146. Matter of H-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 358, 360 (B.I.A. 1954). 
 147. Matter of E-, No. A14 340 742, 2003 WL 23269901, at *1 (B.I.A. Dec. 4, 2003). 
 148. Id. 
 149. 388 F. App’x 182, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 
620–21 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 150. See, e.g., Sanchez-Salvador v. INS, No. 92-70828, 1994 WL441755, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Aug. 
15, 1994) (holding no due process violation for a respondent who was under the care of a doctor 
during the removal hearing for his mental illness because his “incompetence did not prevent him from 
presenting, through counsel, a strong case”). 
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satisfactorily represented.151 Because there is no automatic right to 
appointed counsel in immigration proceedings,152 respondents in this 
situation may still have an argument that an immigration judge’s refusal to 
terminate proceedings violates that respondent’s due process rights. 
The difficulty is that unrepresented individuals with severe mental 
illness may not have the competence to appeal a decision, so the BIA and 
federal courts simply may not see these cases and have the opportunity to 
provide greater guidance on the due process rights of mentally ill 
individuals who are not represented. Given Matter of M-A-M-’s new 
requirement for assessing competence, there may be more cases asserting 
a due process basis for termination of proceedings. Continued monitoring 
of these cases is necessary to determine whether the courts are properly 
analyzing competence and if termination of proceedings for unrepresented 
mentally ill individuals constitutes a due process violation. 
B. Using Prosecutorial Discretion to Divert Individuals Out of 
Proceedings 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion presents an opportunity to 
protect mentally individuals from, not merely within, proceedings. The 
decision to exercise immigration enforcement power against an individual 
is inherently discretionary.153 ICE does not have the resources to remove 
every noncitizen in the United States;154 in March 2011, ICE stated that it 
“only has [the] resources to remove approximately 400,000 aliens per 
year.”155 Developing priorities and utilizing prosecutorial discretion to 
effectuate these priorities channels limited resources to achieve agency 
goals.156 For a large, decentralized agency such as ICE, clarity on the use 
 
 
 151. See Tsankov, supra note 41, at 2. 
 152. See supra note 25. 
 153. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-92 (1999); see also 
Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 110 (B.I.A. 2009) (finding that DHS has prosecutorial discretion 
over granting deferred action); In re Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381, 1391 (B.I.A. 2000) (holding that the 
INS has prosecutorial discretion to decide if the agency will commence removal proceedings).  
 154. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to ICE 
Employees 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302wash 
ingtondc.pdf.  
 155. Id. 
 156. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to 
ICE Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel, re: Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from 
Morton re: Prosecutorial Discretion and Enforcement Priorities] (“ICE must prioritize the use of its 
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of discretion should help agents represent the agency’s goals and 
concerns.157 Additionally, prosecutorial discretion ensures a role for 
humanitarian concerns in immigration control and enforcement.158 
ICE agents and officers exercise prosecutorial discretion at every stage 
of the enforcement process.159 Favorable discretion can be exercised by 
not issuing a Notice to Appear against an individual, so he or she will 
simply not be put in removal proceedings.160 In other situations, 
prosecutorial discretion may result in a grant of deferred action, which 
does not establish lawful status but does grant a temporary reprieve from 
deportation and may allow the alien to apply for an Employment 
Authorization Document.161 A grant of deferred action does not prevent 
ICE from bringing an enforcement action against that individual in the 
future.162 Deferred action could also include a grant of a stay of removal 
for a person whose removal has been ordered.163  
Prosecutorial discretion is constrained by law.164 If a determination or 
act is mandatory under immigration law, the agent or officer generally 
must comply with that legal mandate.165 “Congress may limit an agency’s 
 
 
enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal assets to ensure that the aliens it removes 
represent, as much as reasonably possible, the agency’s enforcement priorities.”).  
 157. See Mary Giovagnoli, What ICE’s Latest Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion Means for 
Future Immigration Cases, HUFFINGTON POST, June 21, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-
giovagnoli/what-ices-latest-memo-on-_b_881517.html (“If ICE officials follow the guidance in [the 
Director’s June 17] memo they can take some comfort in knowing that individual discretion has been 
sanctioned from the top.”).  
 158. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2010).  
 159. Id. at 244 (“Prosecutorial discretion extends to decisions about which offenses or populations 
to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and arrest; whether to detain or to release a noncitizen; whether to 
initiate removal proceedings; whether to execute a removal order; and various other decisions.”). 
 160. See MARY KENNEY, LEGAL ACTION CTR., PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: HOW TO 
ADVOCATE FOR YOUR CLIENT 8, 14 (2011), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/ProsecutorialDiscretion-11-30-10.pdf.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 14. 
 163. Id. at 4. 
 164. See Memorandum from Bo Cooper, Gen. Counsel of INS, to Comm’r of INS 4-6, available 
at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Bo-Cooper-memo.pdf (citing United 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)). For example, prosecutorial discretion is limited by the 
Constitution; decisions may not be unjustifiably based on race, sex, religion, or other classification in 
violation of equal protection. Id. at 6. 
 165. Id. at 4–5. However, in some instances prosecutorial discretion can be implemented to avoid 
triggering a legal mandate. Id. at 5–6. For example, section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act requires that when a notice to appear is issued against an alien with certain types of criminal 
offenses, that alien must be taken into custody in an immigration detention facility and is not eligible 
for bond or release during the pendency of his or her case. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c), 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1996). Kenney points out that while an ICE officer cannot exercise discretion to 
allow that alien to have a bond, the officer could exercise discretion and not issue a notice to appear 
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exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive 
priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to 
discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”166 As the term suggests, 
prosecutorial discretion is a matter left to the discretion of the agency. 
Judicial review of an agency’s decision not to exercise enforcement power 
against an individual is extremely limited.167  
ICE has a long history of providing guidance on the use of 
prosecutorial discretion for individuals in immigration removal 
proceedings.168 In the last year, DHS provided extensive guidance on the 
use of prosecutorial discretion for low and high priority removal cases. On 
June 17, 2011, ICE Director John Morton issued two memoranda on the 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement.169 The first 
memorandum emphasized aligning use of ICE resources with “the 
agency’s enforcement priorities, namely the promotion of national 
security, border security, public safety, and the integrity of the 
immigration system.”170 Effectuating these priorities means sometimes the 
 
 
against the person or, arguably, cancel a notice to appear before it is filed with the immigration court. 
KENNEY, supra note 160, at 5–6.  
 166. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).  
 167. Id. at 831.  
The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an agency decision not to enforce 
often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its 
expertise . . . . The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many 
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities . . . . In addition to these 
administrative concerns, we note that when an agency refuses to act it generally does not 
exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not 
infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect . . . . Finally, we recognize that 
an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the 
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long 
been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch.  
Id. at 831–32.  
 168. See generally Wadhia, supra note 158, at 246–65. 
 169. Memorandum from Morton re: Prosecutorial Discretion and Enforcement Priorities, supra 
note 156; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, re: 
Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs 1 (June 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum 
from Morton re: Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs]. 
 170. Memorandum from Morton re: Prosecutorial Discretion and Enforcement Priorities, supra 
note 156, at 2. This memorandum drew upon other memoranda on the topic of prosecutorial discretion. 
Id. at 1 (referencing memoranda issued by INS General Counsel Sam Bernsen in 1976, INS General 
Counsel Bo Cooper in 2000 and 2001, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner in 2000, Principal Legal 
Advisor William J. Howard in 2005, and Assistant Secretary Julie L. Meyers in 2007). This 
memorandum rescinded two prosecutorial discretion memoranda by Executive Assistant 
Commissioner for Field Operations Johnny N. Williams, the first on Supplemental Guidance 
Regarding Discretionary Referrals for Special Registration from 2002 and the second on Supplemental 
NSEERS Guidance for Call-In Registrants from 2003. Id. at 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2012] AVOIDING AN “UNAVOIDABLY IMPERFECT SITUATION” 497 
 
 
 
 
ICE agent or attorney should not use the “full scope of the enforcement 
authority available to the agency in a given case.”171 The memorandum 
included a lengthy list of factors to consider in determining whether to 
exercise favorable prosecutorial discretion.172 Serious mental or physical 
disabilities and serious health conditions were factors promoting a 
favorable grant of discretion.173 Negative factors included serious or 
lengthy criminal record, risk to national security or public safety, and 
“egregious” immigration law offenses.174 The memorandum emphasized 
that there was no right to favorable prosecutorial discretion and that 
guidance on prosecutorial discretion did not limit ICE’s authority to 
enforce immigration law.175 
Then in August 2011, the government announced that a joint DHS-
Department of Justice working group would conduct case-by-case review 
of all immigration cases pending in immigration courts, at the BIA, and in 
federal appeals courts.176 In November 2011, DHS announced guidelines 
for implementing the priority criteria.177 Although the November 2011 
memorandum states that the June 2011 memorandum should still be 
considered, it altered some criteria and expanded the list of high-priority 
factors.178 Notably, a greater number of individuals with minor criminal 
 
 
 Relevant ICE resources include use of enforcement agents and attorneys, space in detention 
facilities, and resources to physically remove individuals from the United States. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. at 4. 
 173. Id. at 5. Other positive factors include: “veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces; 
long-time lawful permanent residents; minors and elderly individuals; individuals present in the United 
States since childhood; pregnant or nursing women; [and] victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or 
other serious crimes.” Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 6. A second memorandum encouraged officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion to 
ameliorate the deterrent effect that immigration enforcement has on crime victims, witnesses, and civil 
plaintiffs’ willingness to report crimes to the police and pursue legal justice. Memorandum from 
Morton re: Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs, supra note 169, at 1. The memorandum specifically 
focused on victims of domestic violence and individuals engaged in non-frivolous civil rights cases, 
such as unfair labor practice claims, disputes with landlords regarding housing conditions, or 
employment discrimination complaints. Id. at 1–2. 
 176. See Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Security, to Senator Dick Durbin 2 
(Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=36684. 
 177. ALEKSA ALONZO, LEGAL ACTION CTR., DHS REVIEW OF LOW PRIORITY CASES FOR 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 1 (2011), available at http://www.ilcm.org/advocacy/prosecutorial_ 
discretion/LAC%20practice%20advisory%20on%20Pros%20Disc’n%2012-2011.pdf. The memorandum 
containing the guidelines was released on November 17, 2011, along with two other documents on 
implementation of prosecutorial discretion. Id.; Guidance to ICE Attorneys Reviewing the CBP, 
USCIS, and ICE Cases Before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, available at http://www 
.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/guidance-to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-be 
fore-eoir.pdf [hereinafter Guidance to ICE]. 
 178. Guidance to ICE, supra note 177, at 3. 
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convictions or recent immigration violations would be considered high-
priority under the November 2011 memorandum.179 This memorandum 
reinforced serious mental illness as a factor favoring the exercise of 
discretion, noting that individuals who have a serious mental health or 
physical condition requiring significant medical or detention resources 
should not be considered an enforcement priority.180 
The agency’s clarification of priorities provides greater transparency in 
immigration enforcement but many questions remain as to the practical 
utility of this system for immigrants in general and especially for mentally 
ill immigrants. The next section will identify some of the chief concerns 
regarding the implementation of prosecutorial discretion and the 
limitations to prosecutorial discretion working to divert individuals out of 
immigration removal proceedings. 
1. Challenges to Effective Implementation of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Guidelines  
The prosecutorial discretion guidelines present a significant change to 
how immigration agents and counsel consider the individuals before them. 
Thorough training is required to effectuate the guidelines. DHS launched a 
training program to train enforcement staff and counsel on the 
 
 
 179. The June 2011 memorandum included “serious felons, repeat offenders, or individuals with a 
lengthy criminal record of any kind” in the high priority category. Memorandum from Morton re: 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Enforcement Priorities, supra note 156, at 5. The November 2011 
guidance memorandum significantly increases the types of criminal convictions that make an 
individual an enforcement priority, including individuals convicted of: 
• a felony or multiple misdemeanors,  
• illegal entry, re-entry or immigration fraud, or 
• a misdemeanor violation involving— 
o violence, threats, or assault, 
o sexual abuse or exploitation, 
o driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
o flight from the scene of an accident, 
o drug distribution or trafficking, or 
o other significant threat to public safety 
Guidance to ICE, supra note 177, at 1. Whereas the June 2011 memorandum stated that “particular 
care and consideration” should be taken in the case of “egregious” immigration violators, the 
November 2011 memorandum considers individuals who violated the terms of their admission or 
entered the United States without permission in the last three years to be a high priority case, even if 
such violation or admission only occurred once. Compare Memorandum from Morton re: 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Enforcement Priorities, supra note 156, at 5, with Guidance to ICE, supra 
note 177, at 1. 
 180. Guidance to ICE, supra note 177, at 2. 
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prosecutorial discretion guidelines.181 DHS announced that commanding 
officers and prosecutors participated in the training.182 However, the 
National ICE Council, an organization representing approximately 7,000 
deportation officers, raised concern about prosecutorial discretion.183 
National ICE Council leadership expressed concern that the discretion 
guidelines “amounts to orders from ICE officials for agents not to enforce 
the law.”184 The leadership stated that it has “so far not allowed its 
members to participate in the training.”185 Without training, it is not clear 
if prosecutorial discretion will be implemented at all.  
Another concern with the implementation of prosecutorial discretion 
focuses on the power imbalance between individuals and immigration 
officers. “Discretion can also reinforce powerlessness. It recasts an 
applicant as a supplicant.”186 After some incidents of corruption and 
bribery amongst enforcement agents and counsel,187 close attention is 
needed to ensure that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not 
mask abuses of power by officials. Community education and monitoring 
of prosecutorial discretion is necessary to ensure that the use of discretion 
makes the system more—not less—just, particularly with vulnerable 
populations such as individuals with serious mentally illness.  
2. Criminal Convictions Trump Humanitarian Concerns 
ICE’s priorities reflect a serious concern about individuals who violate 
immigration law or have criminal convictions.188 The classification of 
even minor criminal convictions as a negative factor means that many 
individuals will not be able to benefit from prosecutorial discretion 
 
 
 181. Julia Preston, Agents’ Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, 
at A15. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 621 (2006). 
 187. In March 2011, the former assistant chief council of ICE was convicted of thirty-six felony 
counts, including a scheme in which he impersonated a high-ranking immigration official or judge and 
told undocumented immigrants he could help them obtain immigration benefits in exchange for a 
bribe. Sam Allen, Former U.S. Immigration Attorney Sentenced for Taking More Than $400,000 in 
Bribes to Help Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, available at http://latimesblogs 
.latimes.com/lanow/2011/03/former-us-immigration-attorney-accepts-more-than-400000-in-bribes-for-
helping-illegal-immigrants.html. In 2004, a former INS officer was convicted on federal corruption 
and civil rights violations stemming from incidents where he demanded sex and money from two 
women seeking asylum. Former INS Officer Gets 4-Year Prison Term, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/23/local/me-briefs23.1  
 188. See supra notes 170 and 179 and accompanying text. 
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guidelines.189 For individuals with severe mental illness, the criminal-
immigration nexus is particularly damaging. Statistics demonstrate that 
“prisons appear to have become a repository for a great number of . . . 
mentally ill citizens.”190 The Council of State Governments Justice Center 
found in a study of five local jails that 14.5% of men and 31% of women 
entering the jails had a serious mental illness.191 That rate is three to six 
times greater than the rate of mental illness in the non-jailed population.192 
Extrapolating this study to the total number of jail admissions in 2007 
suggests more than two million individuals entering jail in that year had a 
serious mental illness.193  
The reasons the mentally ill population is over-represented in prison 
are complex and varied, but include deinstitutionalization of the mentally 
ill without access to community-based treatment;194 high rates of substance 
dependence or abuse by mentally ill individuals;195 and high arrest rates 
for “lifestyle” crimes.196 The increasing connections between immigration 
enforcement and the criminal justice system mean that a large proportion 
of individuals in the immigration adjudication system will have criminal 
convictions and also mental illness. 
 
 
 189. The decision to arrest an individual and charge him or her with a crime usually occurs before 
an individual interacts with an ICE agent or counsel. For that reason, the prosecutorial discretion in the 
criminal justice system may truly be “the discretion that matters” in determining the outcome of an 
individual’s immigration case. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal 
Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil—Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1819, 1837 (2011). 
 190. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
 191. Press Release, Justice Center: The Council of State Governments, Council of State 
Governments Justice Center Releases Estimates on the Prevalence of Adults with Serious Mental 
Illnesses in Jail (June 1, 2009), available at http://consensusproject.org/jc_publications/council-of-
state-governments-justice-center-releases-estimates-on-the-prevalence-of-adults-with-serious-mental-ill 
nesses-in-jails/MH_Prevalence_Study_brief_final.pdf. Serious mental illness as defined for this study 
included “bipolar disorder, schizophrenia spectrum disorders, and major depression.” Id. It did not 
include “anxiety disorders . . . , adjustment disorders, or acute reactive psychiatric conditions, such as 
suicidal thinking.” Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Shane Levesque, Closing the Door: Mental Illness, the Criminal Justice System, and the 
Need for a Uniform Mental Health Policy, 34 NOVA L. REV. 711, 718–19 (2010). 
 195. A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found much higher rates of alcohol or drug abuse 
or dependence amongst inmates who had a mental health problem than inmates who did not have a 
mental health problem. See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 5 
(2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. In local jails, the difference 
was 76.4% compared to 53.2%; in State prisons 74.1% compared to 55.1%, and in Federal prisons, 
63.6% compared to 49.5%. Id. 
 196. See Levesque, supra note 194, at 719. “Lifestyle crimes are typically nonviolent offenses that 
do not cause direct harm to others, but do create feelings of unease among community members.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/5
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The tensions between the positive discretionary factor of mental health 
and the negative discretionary factors of criminal convictions and 
immigration law offenses are clearly demonstrated by the recent case of 
twenty-two-year-old Mexican citizen Yanelli Hernandez Serrano.197 Ms. 
Hernandez entered the United States unlawfully at age thirteen and during 
her time in the United States was convicted of forgery and driving under 
the influence.198 Her attorney stated that she attempted suicide twice and 
was diagnosed with mood disorder and borderline personality disorder.199 
Ms. Hernandez was ordered removed by an immigration judge on January 
25, 2012.200 She requested a stay of this order of removal in the exercise of 
discretion because removal would cause her great hardship due to her 
mental illness.201  
ICE denied Ms. Hernandez’s request.202 ICE official Rebecca J. Adduci 
stated that Ms. Hernandez did not provide sufficient documentation of her 
claim.203 Additionally, the enforcement priorities played a role in this 
denial.204 Ms. Adduci stated that “[t]he removal of individuals with final 
orders of removal, as well as criminal aliens, is an ICE civil immigration 
enforcement priority.”205 Ms. Hernandez was removed to Mexico on 
 
 
 197. In addition to the mental health factor, Ms. Hernandez also has positive discretionary factors 
of long-term residence in the United States and entry at a young age. Mark Curnutte, Woman Faces 
Deportation, Fate Undecided, CMTY. PRESS CINCINNATI (Jan. 31, 2012), http://communitypress 
cincinnati.com/article/AB/20120131/NEWS/301310067/Woman-faces-deportation-fate-undecided?Odys 
sey=nav%7Chead; see also ICE Deports Former Reading Woman, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20120131/NEWS01/120131032/ICE-deports-former-Reading-
woman-?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. Most recently, Ms. Hernandez attempted suicide while incarcerated. Curnutte, supra note 
197. She previously attempted suicide in 2008. Id. The Cincinnati Enquirer verified this earlier suicide 
attempt with documents obtained from University Hospital. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. The letter to Ms. Hernandez’s attorney stated, “Your request is denied. The basis of this 
request is that your client cannot depart from the United States due to hardships she will face 
stemming from long-term mental illness. You have provided no documentation to support this claim.” 
Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. ICE spokesman Khaalid Walls stated:  
ICE has adopted common sense policies that ensure our immigration laws are enforced in a 
way that best enhances public safety, border security and the integrity of the immigration 
system . . . ICE has adopted clear priorities that call for the agency’s enforcement resources to 
be focused on the identification and removal of those that have broken criminal laws, recently 
crossed our border, repeatedly violated immigration law or are fugitives from immigration 
court. 
Id.  
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January 31, 2012.206 This is a single example with circumstances unique to 
this individual. However, the decision to remove Yanelli Hernandez rather 
than exercise positive discretion demonstrates that the balancing of mental 
illness and criminal convictions may do little to aid individuals with 
criminal convictions. If criminal conviction is seen as trumping all other 
factors, we risk losing the nuanced approach and humanitarian goals of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
3. Obtaining Prosecutorial Discretion Requires Resources 
Arguing for favorable prosecutorial discretion requires significant 
resources.207 Favorable factors, including serious mental disability, are 
often not obvious to the ICE agent or counsel. An individual with severe 
mental illness may need the help of counsel or friends and family to 
document and present these favorable factors.208 This Note is concerned 
with the importance of diverting severely mentally ill people out of the 
system due to the insurmountable barriers they face in arguing their case 
against removal.209 These same barriers will make it more difficult to 
argue persuasively for prosecutorial discretion.  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Currently, termination of proceedings and prosecutorial discretion are 
options for diverting mentally ill individuals out of proceedings in theory, 
not practice. However, the Benchbook discussion of immigration judges’ 
ability to terminate proceedings for individuals with serious mental illness 
may signal a change in agency policy.210 Regulatory reform is needed to 
ensure that judges have greater discretion to terminate proceedings and 
thereby ensure individuals are not removed when they could not 
understand and participate in their hearing.211 Additionally, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion must incorporate a more holistic analysis of an 
 
 
 206. Id.  
 207. See infra note 212. 
 208. Best practices recommended by the Legal Action Center of the American Immigration 
Council suggests providing a memorandum explaining why prosecutorial discretion is appropriate, 
providing additional evidence to support claim of positive factors, using agency memoranda to support 
the argument, and possibly seeking a continuance if the case is already in proceedings. In challenging 
situations, reaching out to elected officials, working with advocacy organizations, and developing 
media campaigns are other recommended strategies. KENNEY, supra note 160, at 11–14.  
 209. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
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individual’s situation. Refusing to grant favorable discretion for all 
individuals with even minor criminal convictions will make prosecutorial 
discretion unavailable to many individuals with mental illness.212 
Together, these more nuanced approaches will ensure that mentally ill 
individuals are not processed through a removal system and removed from 
the United States when they could not present a case. 
Many important questions remain as to what to do with an individual 
after he or she is diverted out of the removal system. This, too, requires a 
case-by-case analysis. Some individuals whose mental health has 
deteriorated while in (and perhaps as a result of) detention or removal 
proceedings may be perfectly capable of functioning in a normal 
community setting. Others may require the support of family, social 
service agencies, or mental health professionals. An ideal response would 
be to engage social workers to provide transitional services, much like the 
services provided to individuals with mental health issues leaving 
hospitals or other state institutions. 
This Note does not answer all of the questions but rather hopes to 
promote consideration of alternatives to detention and removal, instead of 
simply bolstering the current removal system with more procedural 
protections. By expanding options to divert this population out of 
proceedings, we can ensure that immigration law is enforced fairly and 
that wrongful deportations become anecdotes of the past, not a norm of the 
future. 
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 212. See supra notes 188–206 and accompanying text.  
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